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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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5 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable W. Graham Claytor
Deputy Secretary of Defense


SUBJECT: Collection Tasking Staff-DoD Interface



Following up on our discussion about the relationship between the Community's Collection Tasking Staff and DoD, I would like to propose the following:

1. That the Collection Tasking Staff retain its three-man crisis management element in the NMIC as at present.
2. That DoD nominate a two- or three-star Admiral or General to be the deputy to the Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking.
3. That the office space in the NMIC close to the CCF which has been planned for the DCI be formally assigned to the DCI. It would be our intent, then, that the space be utilized in the following manner:
 - a. By the DCI and the D/DCI/Collection Tasking from time to time for purposes of meeting with DoD components in the Intelligence Community;
 - b. By the deputy to the D/DCI/Collection Tasking on a regular basis to improve liaison and coordination with the CCF, in particular, and the NMIC in general;
 - c. As the locus for preparing and conducting the transfer of authority over the NITC whenever such a shift of authority from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense is directed by the President. (This is to include periodic exercises which would involve the transfer of authority over the NITC.)

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d. As a place where a residual DCI element will operate, very likely on a 24-hour basis, whenever authority over the NITC has been shifted from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense.

e. As a place for other members of the Collection Tasking Staff to use as office space when assigned to the Pentagon for short periods of time for the purposes of coordination with their DIA counterparts and familiarization with DoD interests and concerns in the Collection Tasking area.



STANSFIELD TURNER

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S E C R E T

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

SUBJECT : Soviet Brigade in Cuba

1. In the midst of present crises I want to make sure that we don't lose sight of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba. Its been some time since we revisited the issue, and I'd like to take part of an NFIB meeting to discuss whether we are giving the Brigade the proper attention in both collection and production.

2. To help prepare for that discussion, I would like you to work together with Gene and Dave in preparing a paper that addresses the following:

- What is the status of military conditions in Cuba since our last look? How firm can we now be on the Brigade's size and mission, as well as on the Cuban Order of Battle?
 - What indicators are we presently using to track Soviet military activities in Cuba? Are there alternative indicators that we should consider developing?
 - Can we go back and review our assumptions in September and verify if they are still valid? If not what has changed and what does this mean for our analysis?
 - What does consumer reaction to our work in September and to the subsequent support we provided tell us about what decisionmakers want us to track for them on (a) the Soviet presence in Cuba and (b) the Soviet-Cuban relationship?
 - What has been the pattern of activity of the Brigade since September? What have the Soviets said about it? What do we infer from such activities? In looking at the issue again, what signals do we think the Soviets are sending us about the status of the Brigade?
 - What do we now know about Soviet communications in Cuba? Has the Brigade gone off the air, shifted frequencies, or what? Have there been any changes in the pattern of communications of the other Soviet units in Cuba?
 - What level of collection, frequency of collection, and production do we now maintain on the Brigade? Are there any areas in which these efforts should be increased?
 - How are the efforts of each agency coordinated and integrated into a community strategy? Is there sufficient interaction among the analysts to expose blind spots and thrash out alternative judgments?
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3. I'd like to discuss our response to these questions at the next regularly scheduled NFIB meeting. The discussion paper should be available by 15 January. ☐

STANSFIELD TURNER

cc: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of Intelligence and Research, State

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